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WHY ONLY WAR CRIMES? DE-LINKING
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSES FROM
ARMED CONFLICT
by
Steven R. Ratner*

The term war crimes brings to mind a whirlwind of disturbing
memories - from the Holocaust to My Lai to the roundup and
execution of young and old men throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Yet alongside these images of war are others that should not be
neglected by the international community - those of the Kulaks,
or the Gulag, of Mao's millions of victims, or of the Khmer Rouge's
torture chambers. Moving from the millions of victims to the mere
thousands, the recent past has witnessed the phenomenon of the
disappeared throughout Latin America, the practice of slavery in
parts of Africa, and the systematic use of torture worldwide. What
all these atrocities have in common is that they took place outside
of any armed conflict and, thus, cannot be labeled as war crimes,
though they often are.'
There can be no doubt that the notion of the war crime is well
imbedded in international law, as the law has long recognized individual criminal liability for certain violations of the laws of armed
conflict through both treaty and custom.2 More problematic, and
* Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. A.B. Princeton University; M.A.
Institut Universitaire de Hautes ttudes Internationales (Geneva); J.D., Yale Law School. I
appreciate comments from Jason Abrams.
1. See, e.g., U.S. to Pressfor Pol Pot Trial,N.Y. TmsS, July 30, 1997, at A10 (Secretary of

State Albright calling Khmer Rouge leader a "war criminal").
2. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, August 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386; Charterof the
InternationalMilitary Tribunal, art. 6(b), in Agreement for the prosecution and punishment

of the major war criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288;
[hereinafter IMT Charter]; Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of
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less systematic, however, is the law's progress regarding accountability for human rights atrocities in peacetime. Where international
humanitarian law has detailed treaties on the law of armed conflict
that specify those violations incurring individual responsibility, the
body of international human rights law covering situations outside
of armed conflict has tended to focus on the duties of states, rather
than individuals.3 As a result, international law has only a handful
of treaties criminalizing certain human rights atrocities, leaving
some as crimes by virtue of customary law and many abuses not
crimes at all. In those situations where treaty or custom does not
impose individual responsibility, only the state overseeing the
abuses is responsible under international law, with the perpetrators
facing whatever punishment that state may - or may not - choose

to impose.
This essay seeks to examine the causes and consequences of
this schizophrenia in international criminal law.4 Part I addresses
the underlying reason for the international community's preoccupation with war crimes as the primary locus of individual accountability. Part II outlines the trends, some quite significant, in favor of a
breakdown of the linkage between criminality and war and of a
more unified approach to individual accountability. Part III considers the means for strengthening accountability for atrocities during
peacetime.
I.

ROOTS OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CRIMINALITY AND WAR

To the non-international lawyer, the incongruence between, on
the one hand, the prescription in international humanitarian law of

rules specifying the duties of states and imposing criminal liability
on individuals and, on the other hand, the incompleteness in interSecurity Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 9 (showing customary law

status of war crimes).
3. International human rights law refers to the body of international law aimed at
protecting the human dignity of the individual. The law of armed conflict, or international
humanitarian law, addresses limits on warmaking methods (the Law of The Hague) as well as
protections of certain individuals during wartime (the Law of Geneva). STEvEN R. RATNER
&
JASON S. ABRAMS,
ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR HUMAN RIGHTs ATRoCmES
IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 9 (1997).

4. International criminal law is best defined as the international law assigning criminal
responsibility for certain particularly serious violations of international law. It thus overlaps
with international humanitarian and human rights laws to the extent that those bodies of law
provide for individual responsibility. Id.

1999]

WHY ONLY WAR CRIMES?

national human rights law of criminality for many violations of the
law may seem surprising.' Yet the root cause of the schism lies in
the history of international law itself. For despite all the abuses
governments have heaped upon their citizens, international law had
little to contribute on this issue until fairly recently. As defined by
the positivist school that dominated the field from the late 18th century, the law of nations governed exclusively relations between
states (and between their sovereigns), with individuals at best the
third-party beneficiaries of the law of nations. The notion that the
law would even govern behavior of governments vis-h-vis their own
citizens, let alone prescribe accountability for individuals for violations of those rules of conduct, was anathema to the entire exercise.
Internal sovereignty was, until early in this century, nearly complete
and insulated from the law of nations.6
The only areas of international law that addressed violations of
individual rights by governments concerned actions by governments
against citizens of other states - acts deemed an affront to those
states and thus within the ambit of international law.7 In doctrinal
terms, these fell within two areas. First, the law of state responsibility for injury to aliens, which primarily dealt with disruption of
property interests of aliens by foreign states but also included
attacks on individual persons, and second, the laws and customs of
war, which recognized certain limitations on the conduct of war that
thereby indirectly promoted some individual rights in wartime.8 By
the early part of this century, the Law of The Hague (so named due
5. Even under international humanitarian law, not all violations are war crimes. Rather,
the notion is confined to particularly severe violations such as those nominated "grave
breaches" under the Geneva Conventions.
6. See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Fink, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976), dictum rev'd in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Cf S.S. Lotus (Fr.
v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ, ser. A, no. 10, at 18. See generallyW. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and
Human Rights in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990).
7.
See generally Karl Josef Partsch, Individuals in International Law, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLic ITERRNATIONAL LAW 957, 959-60 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995).
Of course, international law addressed another key crime against individuals - piracy - but
that crime, by definition, involved persons not under the control of any government.
8. HUGo GRoTrUs, 2 DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS, ch. 20, § 40 (Louise R. Loomis, trans.,
Walter J. Black, Inc., 1949) (1625). See also EMMERC DE VATr L, 1 LE DROrr DES GENs,
Ch. 19, paras. 232-33 (1758); L.C. Green, InternationalCrimes and the Legal Process,29 INr'L
& Comp. L.Q. 567, 570-72 (1980); Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict, in 2
HumAN RIGH-s IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY Isstus 345, 347 (Theodor

Meron ed. 1984) ("generally speaking, wartime human rights preceded those of peacetime in
the international arena.").
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to the treaties drafted there) had placed some limits on methods of

warfare, while the Law of Geneva imposed certain duties towards
enemy civilians and soldiers no longer engaged in battle.9 But even

the law of war traditionally was silent as to the consequences for
individuals who violated it. Instead, some states signed treaties to
punish as war crimes certain violations of the laws of war.' 0

The silence of international law regarding the consequences for
government-sponsored abuses of human rights began to change

after the First World War, and even more so after World War II.
The Nuremberg Charter gave the International Military Tribunal
jurisdiction not only over traditional war crimes,'" but also over a
new category of crimes - crimes against humanity. These entailed
large-scale, systematic persecution of civilians based on racial, reli-

gious, or political grounds and were meant to address the Holocaust
and similar atrocities. But the definition of crimes against humanity

was limited - to those atrocities committed in connection with the
war." As a practical matter, of course, most of the Nazi crimes
were indeed connected with the war. The new category of crimes
meant that the Allies could prosecute the Nazis for crimes against
other Germans during the war (such as murder and deportations of

German Jews), acts that were not classic war crimes.' 3 But this
linkage also meant that pre-war atrocities against other Germans
4
were not considered crimes against humanity.'

9. See generally GEOFFREY BEsT, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 39-59 (1994); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Regulation of Armed Conflict, 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 201, 201-04 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
10. Yves Sandoz, Penal Aspects of InternationalHumanitarian Law, 1 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 9, at 209,209-213; Leo Gross, The Punishmentof War Criminals:
The Nuremberg Trial,2 NrH. INT'L L. REv. 356, 358 (1955); James W. Garner, Punishment
of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War, 14 AM J. INT'L L. 70 (1920).
11. IMT Charter, supra note 2, art. 6(b).
12. IMT Charter, supra note 2, art 6(c). For background on the linkage, see Roger S.
Clark, Crimes Against Humanity at Nuremberg, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 180-92 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990);
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 193-95 (1948).
13. The court assumed a linkage between the acts and the war crimes or crimes against the

peace because of the chronological overlap, thereby overcoming any jurisdictional obstacles.
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRiMEs COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 195.
14. 22 IMT Trials at 498. See also Egon Schwelb, CrimesAgainst Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
IN'L L. 178, 205 (1946); Elisabeth Zoller, La ddfinition des crimes contre l'humanite, 120
JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 549, 553-55 (1993).
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Notwithstanding significant developments in the law in favor of
breaking the linkage of crimes against humanity with armed conflict
(see part II infra), it proved to have some staying power. Fortyseven years after the IMT Charter, when the UN Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, it defined crimes against humanity as certain acts (murder, extermination, torture, etc.) "when committed in armed conflict," although it at least recognized that the conflict could be
"international or internal in character."' 5
IX.

TRENDS OF DECISION TOWARDS CRIMINALIZATION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCrIEs OUTSIDE OF
ARMED CoNFLIcr

What, then, have been the trends in the other direction, in
favor of criminalizing human rights atrocities without regard to
armed conflict? Five important developments deserve mention.
First, even before the advent of modern human rights law, slavery treaties have called for states to punish those practicing the
slave trade. Most significant among these are the 1926 Slavery
Convention,' 6 the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery,' 7 and the 1950 Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others.' 8 The conventions vary in substance, from mere identification of slavery as a crime, to a duty or right to prosecute, to a duty
to extradite or cooperate in law enforcement.' 9
15. Statute of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Forner Yugoslavia, art. 5, in
Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), supra note 2, at 9.
16. Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, as amended by the Protocol of 7 December 1953,
art. 6, 212 U.N.T.S. 17, 22 ("Parties whose laws do not at present make adequate provision
for the punishment of infractions [under the Convention] . . . undertake to adopt the
necessary measures in order that severe penalties may be imposed .... ).
17. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, The Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
18. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
See 1 M. CrHEnF BAssIoUNI, INTERNATiONAL Crmms: DIGEST/INDEX OF
19.
INTERNATIONAL INsTRUMEm?.rs 499-508 (1986) (categorizing levels of criminality in slavery
instruments). See also STEFAN GLASER, DRorr INTERNATiONAL PPNAL CoNI'rr nNL

121-26 (1970).
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Second, in the years immediately following the war, the United
Nations oversaw the drafting of a treaty that criminalized one particular crime against humanity without any reference to armed conflict - genocide. The 1948 Genocide Convention, however,
includes two very specific criteria to constitute genocide - namely,
that the atrocities be aimed against a racial, religious, national, or
ethnic group; and that they be done with the intent to destroy the
group in whole or in part.2" These criteria were, alas, easily met in
cases like Rwanda and likely met in Saddam Hussein's slaughter of
the Kurds in Iraq."' But the narrow definition of genocide has
meant that some horrendous government-sponsored atrocities do
not qualify, the most notable recent example being the terror of the
Khmer Rouge. Although they committed genocide against certain
minorities in Cambodia, the bulk of their atrocities were aimed
against victims based on their politics or social status. (Only a tiny
part of their murders were classic war crimes, principally against
Vietnamese during Cambodia's conflict with Vietnam.) 22
Third, beginning in 1950, the United Nation's International
Law Commission has sought to draft a comprehensive regime of
individual criminality through the Code of Offenses against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. This process has staggered along
slowly. After completing a draft in 1954, it suspended work until
1983 because some states insisted that the General Assembly first
reach a definition of aggression (the first crime in the draft code).
From 1983 to 1996, it debated anew the definitions of crimes and
the scope of the list, completing a new draft code in 1996, though
that document's future remains uncertain. 23
Fourth, international organizations have overseen the drafting
of a small number of treaties that have criminalized atrocities other
than genocide regardless of their setting. Most notable are the 1984
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
21. On Iraq, see Memorandum from Lori F. Damrosch, Columbia University School of
Law, to Andrew Whitley, Middle East Watch, entitled Kurdish Genocide Case - Legal

Memorandum for Governments (June 4, 1993) (on file with author).
22.
23.

RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 3, at 243-53.
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the

International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) [hereinafter ILC Draft Code].
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment24 and the Organization of American States conventions on torture' and on disappearances.26 They clearly create individual responsibility under
international law by obligating states to extradite or prosecute all
offenders found on their soil.
Finally, recent state practice in the drafting of statutes for ad
hoc and permanent international criminal courts suggests that most
states have come to accept publicly that crimes against humanity which still remain uncodified by treaty - can indeed be committed
in the absence of armed conflict. The Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, passed by the Security Council in
1994, contains no nexus whatsoever to armed conflict.27 The
debates in the United Nations on the jurisdiction of the future permanent international criminal court also suggest that most states
are willing to dispense with the connection, though a few powerful
states, such as China, seem reluctant to endorse the notion for fear
that their own activities against civilians could be seen as crimes.28
This position has also received judicial approval as well from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.29
What has accounted for this modest progress? With the exception of the long-standing criminality of slavery, these developments
have stemmed from nothing less than two core constitutive changes
in the very nature of international law since the end of World War
II. First, with the creation of a corpus of human rights law beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the
24. U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, Dec. 10, 1984, GA Res. 39146, Annex,

U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
25. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, art. 2,
O.A.S. T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986).
26. Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, 33

I.L.M. 1529 (1994).
27.

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, S/RES/955, Nov. 8, 1994,

Annex.
28. Summary of the Proceedings of the PreparatoryCommittee During the Period of 25
March - 12 April 1996,U.N. Doc. AIAC.249/1, at 17, 67-70 (1996) [hereinafter Prep.
Committee Summary]; U.S. Department of State memorandum on positions of delegations

regarding jurisdiction of an international criminal tribunal, 1995 (on file with author); Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (no nexus).
29. Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR 72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Yugoslavia Tribunal Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995,
majority opinion, paras. 140-41, at 73, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 72 (1996); Prosecutor v.
Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, Opinion and Judgment, Yugoslavia Tribunal Trial Chamber, May 7,
1997, paras. 622-27, at 234-37, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 936-38 (1997).
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way a government treats its own citizens has clearly become a matter of international regulation, not state prerogatives. 30 It was thus
inevitable that states would eventually come to regard some of the
most egregious violations of human rights as fit for individual criminal responsibility and not merely state civil responsibility.
A second constitutive change at work in contributing to states'
willingness to entertain notions of accountability for peacetime
atrocities was the United Nations Charter's proscription on all
armed force not used in self-defense. 3 ' As a consequence, the
international law notion of war and peace as two legally distinct
states of affairs, equally acceptable normatively, with different rules
to govern them, has become anachronistic. 32 Human rights treaties,
for instance, clearly apply in times of armed conflict, even if states
are free to derogate from some of their provisions in these situations.3 And, conversely, certain acts against civilians that were
punishable only when committed during armed conflict are now
susceptible to punishment in peacetime.
At the same time, the criminality of peacetime atrocities has
not caught up with that of war crimes. One important manifestation of the difference is the scale of the abuses necessary to trigger
criminality. For instance, if a soldier kills one POW, it is a war
crime, as the Geneva Conventions contain no requirement of
scale;34 in peacetime, however, criminality generally requires more

than an isolated murder under either the Genocide Convention or
30. See, e.g., MYREs S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 313-32

(1980); Reisman, supra note 6.
31. U.N. CHAmTR art. 2, para 4. As noted, the Nuremberg Charter made aggressive war
not merely illegal, but a crime for which individuals could be brought to trial. Yet the lack of
a clear definition for purposes of individual criminal responsibility and the difficulties of
factual inquiries (including the possibility of biased investigations) have contributed to a lack
of consensus on holding individuals culpable, as seen by the unwillingness of the Security
Council to include them in the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. For a sense of the debate,
see Prep. Committee Summary, supra note 28, at 12-13 (debates of Preparatory Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court). For commentary, see, e.g., Bert
V.A. R6ling, Crimes Against Peace, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 7, at 875.

32. See, e.g., Clive Parry, The Function of Law in the International Community, in
MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 33-36 (Max Sorensen ed. 1968); LUNG-CHU
CHEN, AN INTRODUCrION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 316-19 (1989).

33.

See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 4, 999

U.N.T.S. 171, 175; Dinstein, supra note 8, at 350-56.
34. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 85.
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the customary law on crimes against humanity,35 and there is no
treaty which criminalizes individual summary executions. But, perhaps strangely, the torture of that one political prisoner in peacetime is a crime because of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, which covers individual instances.36

IH.

TOWARD GREATER ACCOUNTABiLITy FOR PEACETIME
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES

If the relatively unsystematic criminalization of peacetime

atrocities (at least as compared to war crimes) is now anachronistic,
what can states do to rectify the dichotomy?
First, states must ratify and implement the treaties already concluded. That means, for instance, in the case of the Torture Convention or the Organization of American States Convention on
Disappearances, that states with custody over an offender must
carry out their obligation to extradite or prosecute him. Relatedly,
states must comply with their existing obligations under the Security Council resolutions establishing the Yugoslavia and Rwanda
tribunals.37 As long as they fail to carry out these mechanisms of
individual responsibility, they incur state responsibility for illegal
conduct.
Second, states can prepare further treaties criminalizing such
atrocities and requiring states to extradite or prosecute offenders.
Areas such as summary executions and sexual crimes would seem
most appropriate for further codification. A treaty on crimes
against humanity would also be helpful. The definitions in the
I.L.C.'s 1996 Draft Code represent a promising starting point in this
connection.38
Third, states should assert their rights under customary international law to enact statutes that permit them to prosecute for
atrocities that take place beyond their borders, under the theory of
universal jurisdiction, and then go ahead and prosecute such atroci35.

See, e.g., id at 37; Yugoslavia Tribunal Statute, supra note 15, art. 5 ("directed against

any civilian population"); Rwanda Tribunal Statute, supra note 26, art. 3 ("part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population"); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra

note 3, at 57-60.
36. Torture Convention, supra note 24, art. 1.
37. S/RES/827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year., Res. & Dec., at 29, U.N. Doc. SINF/49 (1993);
S/RES/955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, Res. & Dec., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1994).

38. ILC Draft Code, supra note 23, arts. 16-20, at 83-120.
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ties. For example, although the Genocide Convention only requires
states to prosecute for genocide that takes place on their territory,39
customary international law clearly recognizes the right (though not
the duty) of a state to prosecute for genocide committed anywhere,
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim. 0 Similar principles of universal jurisdiction also apply to crimes against
humanity, 4 1 slavery,42 and torture. 43 Utilization of this strategy
would help deny a safe haven to some offenders. States have, to
date, been extremely reluctant to assert universal jurisdiction to
prosecute.' Instead, they have generally prosecuted for human
rights abuses abroad only where another basis for jurisdiction
45
prevails, e.g., the nationality of the offender or the victim.
Lastly, NGOs and others need to be conscious of the fact that
individual accountability need not always equate with criminal
accountability. Indeed, states have experimented in recent years
with a variety of mechanisms to provide for recognition of individual responsibility in addition to, and often instead of, criminal prosecutions. Most common and publicized have been the investigatory
or "truth" commissions, but other methods have been attempted as
well, including lustration, or denial of certain employment positions
39. Genocide Convention, supra note 20, art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
40. See Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Dist.
Ct. Jerusalem 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Israel 1962) (basing jurisdiction on protective,
passive personality, and universality principles); In re the Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F.
Supp. 1468 (N.D. Ohio), aft'd, 776 F. 2d. 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986); see also RESTATEMENT (Tium)) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES § 404 (1987) [hereinafter RSTATEMENT].
41. See generally Demjanjuk and Eichmann, supra note 40. See also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 40, § 404; Letter dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to
the Presidentof the Security Council, Feb. 10, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25274, at 20; Kenneth C.
Randall, Universal JurisdictionUnder InternationalLaw, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785, 788-90, 814
(1988).
42. See RESTATEmENT, supra note 40, § 404; Randall, supra note 41, at 798-800 & n.79.
43. RESTATEmENT, supranote 40, § 404; 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994) Crimes (Torture) Act,
1988 Austl. Acts. No. 148, § 6; but see Randall, supra note 41, at 788-90, 822-23.
44. See Anthony DePalma, CanadiansSurprised by Proposalto Extradite Pol Pot, N.Y.
TimEs, June 24,1997, at A10; but see Alan Cowell, Bosnian Serb Is Sentenced to Life Term for
Genocide, N.Y. Tnvms, September 27, 1997, at A5.
45. See Laurent Greilsamer, Poursdquestration et torture de deux religieusesfranfaises le
capitaine argentin Alfredo Astiz est condamn6 4 la r~clusion criminelle d perp~tuit4 par
contumace, LE MONDE, Mar. 19, 1990, at 1 (trial in absentiaby France against Argentine for
murder of French nuns); Marlise Simons, Unforgiving Spain PursuesArgentine Killers, N. Y.
TnMms, Oct. 24, 1996, at A3; Argentina nixes extradition of Italian, Agence France-Presse,
Aug. 25, 1996 (available on NEXIS).
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to those responsible for abuses, and the opportunity to file civil
suits against human rights abusers, a practice allowed under the
U.S. Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act.46
A prescription of strategies for enforcing individual accountability must, however, conclude with a caveat. However important
further elaboration and enforcement of international criminal law
concerning human rights abuses will be, it cannot be a substitute for
other forms of action, and it would indeed be a serious error for the
international human rights community to focus all its attention on
this enterprise. Rather, the traditional strategies to secure compliance with international human rights laws remain pertinent as
states and international organizations continue the experiment with
individual accountability. These means turn on making the state or
non-state entity committing abuses assume the responsibility for the
action of its agents through the glare of international publicity
shown on abuses by the international organizations and NGOs,
through diplomatic isolation, through economic sanctions, and, in
exceptional cases, through military intervention to prevent or bring
a halt to large-scale atrocities. Given the state of enforcement
mechanisms for international criminal law, those contemplating or
committing human rights abuses may not yet fear individual
accountability. But they should know that the international community remains prepared to make robust use of other sanctioning
devices.

46. For background, see RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 3, at 201-11.

